G20: TOWARDS A NEW WORLD ORDER

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The displacement of the G8 by the G20 as the “premier forum for international economic cooperation”, announced in Pittsburgh last year, took place at a very particular juncture of events. It was undoubtedly a consequence of the economic crisis. However, it also occurred against the background of a major geopolitical shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific, resulting from the emergence of new global powers in international affairs; a shift potentially accelerated by the economic crisis itself.\[1\]

While most observers have already noted that the global distribution of power has fundamentally shifted, there still remains a significant uncertainty around the coming order for the next decades or maybe more. In this regard, the transition from the G8 to the G20 symbolizes the transition from an old world order, dominated by transatlantic actors, to a new world order marked by a power struggle between established powers and emerging powers.

This paper proposes to take a closer look at this new world order in the making which has led to the recent upgrade of the G20. It will focus more particularly on the multipolarization of the world in the economic, political and military dimensions. It will then look at how this multipolarization has affected the global order and eventually where the G20 fits into the coming order, from a European perspective.

As a preliminary note, let us say that we will often refer to the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) when discussing emerging powers, based on a previous study of this author which identified these countries as relevant emerging actors.\[2\] However, we certainly do not limit the concept of emerging powers to the BRIC countries and we will pay due attention to other emerging countries such as Mexico or South Africa when appropriate.

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1. ON THE EMERGENCE OF POWER

Are the BRIC countries (or others) rising? According to some indicators they are, and at an impressive pace moreover. Looking at some other indicators, they are still lagging far behind, or sometimes even show negative trends. There is to this day no consensus on naming the emerging powers\(^1\) or — truth be told — defining what an emerging power is. This has probably a lot to do with the poor conceptualization of the term itself, and a general confusion between the fuzzy concepts of emerging powers, emerging countries, emerging economies, or emerging markets.

Discussions around emerging powers are generally tainted with an economic background, seemingly following Paul Kennedy’s thesis in his *Rise and Fall of Great Powers* that economic development is necessary and preliminary to political and military emergence.\(^2\) Hence, an emerging power is expected to go through a phase of economic development in order to integrate and dominate a growing share of global economy. In this regard, the concept of emerging power could be put in parallel with the concept of emerging market economy forged by Antoine van Agtmael, an analyst of the World Bank in the 1980s in order to characterize countries in rapid transition, industrializing, with high economic growth rates that offered opportunities for economic and financial investments.\(^3\)

Today, international organizations like the IMF or the OECD, and private financial companies like Morgan Stanley or Standard & Poor’s continue to refer to concepts such as emerging economies or emerging markets while recognizing that they are evolving and flexible categories that are not unproblematic.\(^4\) For instance, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey are members of the OECD — an organization of developed and democratic countries — but are still simultaneously considered as emerging economies.

Not all emerging economies become emerging powers though. The “Asian dragons” (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) followed by the “Asian tigers” (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) are famous cases of emerging markets and yet no one would consider any of these countries as a global or even as a


regional power. The reason is that power is not only about finance and economics. There are many other factors that need to be taken into account.

What all these concepts of emergence — emerging markets, economies, powers, etc. — have in common is the idea of a path: they are coming from somewhere to reach somewhere else. Most emerging countries are still considered today as developing countries (at the notable exception of the OECD members mentioned above) which need to catch up with the developed world. This idea is very powerful, because it is what drives hopes and ambitions within these countries and what drives fears or fantasies in the developed world.

Beyond having the fact that they are emerging in common, emerging countries are essentially characterized by fundamental differences. To begin with, they are still at very different levels of development. For instance, we find them in the four different income groups (per capita) of the World Bank: among low income economies ($975 or less) no emerging power figures in 2010 although India was still in this group in 2007; among lower middle income economies ($976-$3,855) figure China and India; among upper middle income economies ($3,856-$11,905) figure Brazil, Russia and South Africa; and among high income economies ($11,906 or more) figure Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea.[1]

Then, emerging countries have very distinctive historical and cultural backgrounds. China and Russia are (former) communist regimes. India is the former leader of the non-aligned countries, and a country with democratic and pluralistic values. Brazil and South Africa share an autocratic past on two different continents.

Finally, emerging countries have followed distinct paths of development which still influence the shape of their economies today, proving moreover that there is more than one model of development, i.e. the Western one. Brazil and India, for instance, have followed a model of industrialization by substitution of importations; while China has followed a model of industrialization by exportations.

In summary, the main characteristic of emerging powers is that they are above anything else emerging economies. In fact, they even receive an official label for their economic performance from various financial institutions, which is therefore an important recognition of their economic status; whereas there is no such label for their power performance, which is only left to mutual perceptions and subjective analysis. No wonder then to see emerging powers so active on the international stage to defend their contested status.

[1] To see the country classification on the website of the World Bank, visit http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0.
There is a fundamental distinction between emerging economy and emerging power; however, for economy is only one albeit important aspect among other dimensions of national power. Economic emergence is tightly related to power emergence—and it can reasonably be seen as a necessary precondition—but it is by no means a sufficient condition for global power.

As explained in a 2005 RAND paper, “state power can be conceived at three levels: (1) resources or capabilities, or power-in-being; (2) how that power is converted through national processes; and (3) power in outcomes, or which state prevails in particular circumstances”[1]. The third level is naturally perceived as the most important by policy-makers, but it is also the most elusive. The second level is also very difficult to measure and to objectify. In the end, the first level, i.e. the state as a “capability container”, is the most convenient basis for measuring national power, although indicators remain purely indicative—not deterministic—and should be seen in light of the two other levels.

In conclusion, an emerging power is a country—or more precisely an actor, to reflect debates on the emergence of the European Union (EU) as a global power—that is developing growing resources and capabilities in most or all dimensions of power, and that is increasingly able to convert those resources and capabilities into global power. The emphasis on outcomes is important because a country that is not willing or able to use its capabilities internationally cannot be considered a power. The extent of these resources and capabilities as well as the will to transform them into power will determine whether an actor will be a global, regional or local power. The rest of this chapter will describe the multipolarization of the global order in three key dimensions: economy, politics and military. It will then assess the implications of this multipolarization for the international system.

2. ECONOMIC MULTIPOLARIZATION

More than anywhere else, emerging powers are rising fast in the global economy. In purely economic terms, it is hard to ignore their rise: in 1995 the BRIC countries cumulated approximately 7% of global GDP; ten years later their share was just reaching a two-digit number; and in 2009 their share was rising up to 15.5% of...
global GDP\textsuperscript{[1]}, although they already represent over 20\% of global GDP at Purchasing Power Parity.\textsuperscript{[2]}

China is undoubtedly the fastest rising economy among the BRICs. It leapfrogged Germany as the third largest national GDP in 2007 and it became the second biggest economy in early 2010, passing just before Japan which was slower to recover from the economic crisis. In 2009, China also became the world’s largest exporter and the world’s biggest auto market.

According to Jim O’Neill, and with all the caution necessary when handling predictions, the BRIC economies together will be larger in dollar terms than the G-7 by 2027 despite — or maybe thanks to — the economic crisis.\textsuperscript{[3]} By 2050, the nominal GDP\textsuperscript{[4]} (i.e. the most commonly used indicator) of China could be twice as big as that of America, while India could rise up to equal levels with the US. In terms of real GDP however (i.e. an indicator excluding price changes and generally considered more reliable to compare economies over time), China will only reach equal levels with the EU at around 20\% by 2040, just behind the US, while other emerging economies will still lag behind, e.g. India and Japan at around 5\% and Russia and Brazil at around 2-3\%.\textsuperscript{[5]}

Beyond the BRICs, several economies have the potential to emerge in the coming decades. Based on nominal GDP, Mexico and Indonesia in particular could catch up with most G-7 members by 2050, although only Mexico will be able to rival them in terms of GDP per capita. Nevertheless, while these countries will catch up with the G-7, BRIC economies will further deepen the gap with all their followers.\textsuperscript{[6]}

Another major difference between the emergence of the BRICs and the rise of the next economies (Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Vietnam, etc.) is that the BRICs have had a much greater impact on the global economy. Indeed, between 2000 and 2007, BRIC members contributed 27\% of global growth — more than the US — essentially thanks to China. These numbers have further increased with

\textsuperscript{[1]} As some authors have pointed out, GDP is a surprisingly complicated indicator of national power. While GDP at PPP might better reflect quality of life, nominal GDP might make more sense to measure real hard national power. See for instance Zakaria, F., The Post-American World (New York, Norton, 2008).


\textsuperscript{[4]} Nominal GDP is calculated at current exchange rates, which means that numbers are increased by the level of inflation. Real GDP, on the contrary, is calculated at constant prices.

\textsuperscript{[5]} Author’s interview with a macroeconomist, Brussels, 15 June 2009.

the economic crisis. In a similar period, South Korea, Mexico and Indonesia only contributed to 5.5% of global growth and the impact of their emergence (even including other economies such as Turkey) is likely to be a smaller story than the emergence of BRICs because they are already more urbanized and integrated into the world economy.\footnote{1}

There is something misleading, nevertheless, in naively comparing global GDPs. Indeed, if it says something about the economic power of a country, it does not say much about the economic condition of its citizens and how they benefit from the economic growth of their country. One very imperfect indicator is GDP per capita, according to which Russia ranks in 73\textsuperscript{rd} position, Brazil in 102\textsuperscript{nd}, China in 133\textsuperscript{rd} and India in 167\textsuperscript{th}.\footnote{2} GDP per capita, ranking China just behind Albania or India behind the West Bank, reveals the true face of these emerging economies in which poverty is still largely present and major challenges are still ahead for local governments. However, GDP per capita still gives a rather imperfect picture of disparities among the population which are better (although still very imperfectly) illustrated by the Gini coefficient measuring income distribution. According to the Gini coefficient, China and Brazil are characterized by high income inequality, while Russia and India are closer to EU levels.\footnote{3}

Globalization has its dark side: it tends to increase disparities and deepen internal tensions. For instance, studies have shown that over the last decade, despite an impressive economic growth, the income of 400 million Chinese either stagnated or declined, while the poorest 10\% of the country saw their economic situation worsen dramatically.\footnote{4} Hence, emerging economies still face many extraordinary challenges (demographic, social, economic, political) and it is only the authorities’ capacity to address these issues effectively that will determine the true emergence of emerging powers. Along the road, some kind of reform will most likely be needed, but not all current governments are willing yet to accept that eventualty.

Overall, globalization had a positive impact on poverty alleviation and the improvement of global well-being, as the emergence of the BRICs allowed millions to escape from poverty. In itself, this is a key argument for developed countries to encourage and not resist the emergence of new economic poles. In this sense, the rise of the

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\item \footnote{2} CIA World Fact Book, CIA, \url{https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html}.
\item \footnote{4} Lee, J., Structural flaws will limit China’s rise, \textit{World Politics Review}, 10 November 2009.
\end{itemize}}
BRICs is good news for the world. Beyond these humanist considerations — that are so important to the EU — it must be underscored that industrialized countries also benefit economically from the emergence of new economies, in terms of trade, or access to cheap labour and cheap products.\footnote{It could be noted here that emerging countries themselves benefit from the emergence of other countries. Trade among the BRIC countries has multiplied since the early 2000s, hence accelerating further their economic development.} Hence, if the relative weight of the West has decreased economically relative to emerging powers, Western countries have benefited in absolute terms from the opening of new markets, for their GDP per capita increased in recent years, and with it the well-being of Western citizens.\footnote{O’NEILL, J., The new shopping superpower, Newsweek, 30 March 2009; O’NEILL, J., Les BRIC, nouvelles grandes puissances dans le futur?, Revue internationale et stratégique, No. 72 (2008/2009), pp. 231-243; author’s interview with a macroeconomist, Brussels, 15 June 2009.}

\section*{3. Political Multipolarization}

The political weight of the BRIC countries is rising as illustrated by the international attention received by the two BRIC Summits held in Russia in 2009 and Brazil in 2010. Together, they now have an influential voice calling for a multipolar and pluralistic world order, mirroring aspirations of a great number of countries worldwide that question the legitimacy of existing international organizations. Depending on the issue, they can also morph into other acronymic clubs, such as BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) when negotiating on climate change, or IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) when discussing South-South cooperation among democracies.

There are too many divergences and tensions among BRIC nations (e.g. between India and China) for the forum to become something more than a club meeting once in a while. Beyond the notoriety of the BRIC club, however, each member has gained political clout in the recent years, despite significant differences between each country’s political weights. Besides the BRIC countries, some other emerging powers have also gained access to global politics, such as South Africa during the climate negotiations or Turkey when negotiating directly with Iran on nuclear issues.

China and Russia sit both in the UN Security Council as permanent members. In this regard, they already belong to one of the most exclusive clubs in the world. Officially, they support a reform of the UNSC, in order to include Brazil and India, although historically China opposed the adhesion of India and the support of Beijing is still filled with uncertainty. Brazil has been a regular non-permanent
member of the UNSC (10 times since 1946), while India was represented six times, but only once since the end of the Cold War (in 1991-92).

BRIC countries, especially India, China and Brazil, have also found interest in another body of the UN: peacekeeping operations. Indeed, they all have increased significantly their human contributions to UN missions and therefore have their say in those missions. India is clearly the main contributor among the BRIC with just less than 9,000 soldiers and police, while Brazil and China have over 2,000 each.

In terms of regional influence, the four BRIC members stand in completely different positions. China is the uncontested superpower in Asia, and it has even started to enlarge its influence beyond its direct neighborhood, confronting Russia (in Central Asia) and India (in the Indian Ocean) in their traditional spheres of influence. Russia is essentially a regional power, with strong ties with former Soviet states that are institutionalized through various organizations (Commonwealth of Independent States, Collective Security Treaty Organisation). One organization — the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — is of particular interest as it gathers Russia, China and Central Asian countries into one forum, hence illustrating the potential for cooperation but also competition between Russia and China in the region. India sits in a relatively uncomfortable situation as it is surrounded by countries with which it holds problematic relationships (e.g. Pakistan or China) despite being the largest country in South Asia, and therefore cannot use its regional leadership to support its aspirations to global power. Finally, Brazil is undeniably a mammoth in South America although it has failed to emerge as a leader yet, uniting the South American nations, despite being a founding member of the MERCOSUR. In fact, the Brazilian foreign policy continuously oscillates between regional ambitions and global ambitions which it has pursued through its alliances with other large nations (e.g. South Africa or India) in order to emerge as a leader of the South.

Most emerging powers have particular connections with the South — or developing world — being part of it themselves. They have regularly used that position of leadership among the developing world to pressure the North and obtain favorable decisions, notably through the G77 in the UN. However, in recent years the relationship between the emerging South and the developing South has fundamentally changed. To begin with, the share of financial and trade flows between the emerging south and the developing south has increased relative to global flows.\[1\] Then, the share of development aid from the emerging South to the developing South, taking the form of loans, grants or foreign direct investments (FDI) has

increased as well, opening new perspectives on development[1], although the aid of some emerging countries — especially China — has been criticized by developed countries for lacking to encourage good governance in the developing world and focusing exclusively on resources-rich countries.[2] The deepening of these different economic ties has allowed emerging countries to develop their relationships with and henceforth their influence over the developing world — directly but also indirectly when using these privileged relationships to obtain political back-up in international disputes.

If the South-South ties have become more apparent recently, one should also note the fragmentation that has appeared within the South. Indeed, as the BRIC countries emerge rapidly they are increasingly distancing themselves from the developing world, although continuously claiming to be part of it. This growing leap that emerging countries have to achieve between the developed and the developing world leads to an increasing number of tensions and contradictions, as illustrated for instance during the Copenhagen conference when the BASIC countries (with the support of other countries, such as oil and gas producers) found themselves in opposition with both developed (i.e. the European Union) and developing worlds (e.g. small states islands or the African Union).[3]

4. MILITARY MULTIPOLARIZATION

Military indicators are sometimes regarded as obsolete tools for measuring power in a world where major wars are deemed to be “improbable”[4]. This optimism is not without precedent, and one can easily recall the post-WWI era, for instance, when people were convinced that they had fought “la der’ des der” or “the war to end all wars”. But who can honestly predict war and peace in the next 20 years? “Strategic surprises” are a constant factor in history[5], not to mention that tensions are not lacking between emerging powers, e.g. between China and Russia or between China and India. Moreover, military capabilities are still an important component


of the perception of power by the other actors. Hence, military indicators can and should still be used as a measure of power.

Before reviewing the statistics, we cannot but underscore that the size of the armed forces is a mere indicator but not a determinant of the strength of a country. History has seen many armies defeated by smaller forces that had better commanders, the technological advantage, or better morale. The use of other indicators, such as the number of warships, submarines, or nuclear warheads can help in refining our perception of relative strength, although the following is certainly an incomplete overview of military capabilities.

The US is the world’s largest military spender by far. In 2008, its military expenditure amounted to approximately US$550 billion, which is almost equal to the sum of military expenditure by all the other countries taken together. The EU member states accounted together come in second position with half the US budget. Among the BRICs, China and Russia clearly lead the game, respectively spending US$63.643 and US$38.238 billion, although the military spending of China are subject to intense debates.\(^1\) India and Brazil spend less on their armed forces (respectively US$24.716 and US$15.477 billion) but they have both doubled their budget since 1990. Japan is another significant military spender, with defense expenditures reaching US$42.751 billion in 2008, whereas Mexico and South Africa are both midgets at levels of US$3 billion each.

Beyond absolute numbers, it is interesting to compare how this military spending has evolved between 2000 and 2008. China is undeniably the fastest militarizing country, with an increase by 170% of its expenditures, while Russia follows with a 100% increase. India and Brazil are again far behind their BRIC fellows, with respective increases of 40 and 20%. Regarding the West, the difference between the US and the EU is telling: while the US increased its spending by 60% (mainly as a consequence of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq), the EU member states taken together increased it by only 6%.

In terms of boots, China has the largest armed forces in the world with over 2 million men and women in uniform. The EU and the US share the second rank with over 1.5 million men and women in service. India comes in fourth position (1.3 million), while Russia has seen the most spectacular reduction in its armed forces (1 million), cutting by a factor four its efectives between 1990 and 2008.

\(^1\) China’s official documents reported military spending at US$60.1 billion in 2008, but the US Department of Defense estimated it to be in reality somewhere between US$105 and US$150 billion for the same year.
In comparison to these million-strong armed forces, Brazil looks quite light with its 325,000 men and women in uniform.

A final indicator that is very illustrative of the (difference of) power of the BRIC countries is nuclear power. The country with the most nuclear weapons stockpiles is Russia (about 14,000), largely outnumbering the US (about 5,400), although the Russians have a relatively similar number of operational ones (5,000 for Russia, 4,000 for the US), and the new START agreement signed in April 2010 plans to reduce the amount of operational nuclear weapons to approximately 1,500 each. China and India have much less nuclear weapons (less than 200 operational ones for China, less than 50 for India), while Brazil abandoned its nuclear program in the 1980s and included a non-amendable clause in its constitution forbidding itself from ever developing a nuclear weapon. The EU in itself is not a nuclear power, although two of its major member states — France and the UK — have both nuclear capabilities.

Despite significant differences among the BRIC countries regarding their military capabilities, they all remain essentially regional powers. China is undeniably the rising challenger, while Russia can still count on its nuclear arsenal for its own prestige, but none of the BRIC countries is currently able to challenge the US in conventional warfare[^1], and this situation is unlikely to change in the near future.

One should highlight here the favorable situation that Brazil enjoys being on another continent with no direct military competitor save Venezuela, whereas the three RIC countries are more exposed to regional tensions, military escalation and arms race.

As for the EU, the sum of its member states capabilities make it a great power but in this military equation the EU is by far inferior to the sum of its parts and cannot compare with traditional military actors.

### 5. THE COPENHAGEN SYNDROME

This article has shown that the world has changed fundamentally since the end of the Cold War and that it would be illusory for established powers to continue ruling the world as if nothing had changed. Indeed, in this new world order, no problem can be dealt with unilaterally, and less and less issues can be solved without

[^1]: The situation might be slightly different when it comes to unconventional warfare, such as cyber warfare for instance where Russia and China seem to have shown a certain mastery.
the cooperation of emerging powers, as illustrated by the economic crisis or the Copenhagen conference.

Yet, it is not clear whether the new multipolar order will lead to exacerbated cooperation or competition among global powers. History taught us that the emergence of new powers challenging the old order can lead to many different scenarios, depending on the players’ ability to adapt to each other and to their environment. We should also take from history that multipolarity is not inherently cooperation-driven, as illustrated by the competition between 19th century great powers in a world that was already multipolar and interdependent (even more interdependent than today, according to several indicators such as trade to GDP or capital flows[1]).

In Copenhagen, the world witnessed the incapacity of established and emerging powers to sit down and resolve one of the most pressing issues of our times. In fact, it revealed a certain amount of symptoms of the new world order which together form what could be called the “Copenhagen syndrome”[2], i.e. a world order characterized by: (1) global challenges but national responses; (2) domination without rule-making by the G2 de facto composed by the US and China; (3) emerging powers increasingly looking to have their say on the international stage partly because they are increasingly able to; (4) a growing realization that Western priorities and sense of urgency are not always shared with emerging powers; (5) not one but a multitude of developing worlds; and (6) a marginalization of the EU on the international stage.

To avoid a repetition of the 19th century scenario or of the “Copenhagen syndrome”, we ought to reflect today on the shape of tomorrow’s global order. At the core of this reflection will be the question: How to get from a multipolar disorder to a multilateral order? The answer can be summarized in one word: adaptation. To quote the father of adaptation’s theory, Charles Darwin, “in the long history of humankind (and animal kind, too) those who learned to collaborate and improvise most effectively have prevailed”. But how can established and emerging powers collaborate in new ways in order to prevail?

The EU preference for a cooperative form of multipolarity is well-known and referred to as “effective multilateralism”, i.e. systemic and rule-based multilateralism. This preference inscribes itself in a long-term strategy for promoting peace.


and multilateral cooperation, but it can also be seen as the result of a calculated choice for there are very few other options on the table.

A global reform of multilateralism is clearly in the interest of the EU which “would have nothing to gain and everything to lose if it operated in a world governed by unstable power games in which it was one among various competing power players”[1]. But a reform of multilateralism would also be in the general interest because we all have everything to lose and nothing to gain from a world governed by unstable power games if it leads to a paralysis in the resolution of key global challenges such as climate change and nuclear proliferation, for the entire system is equally threatened in the end.

As stated in the 2003 ESS: “in a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system.” And therefore, “the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective. (…) We want international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.”[2]

However, despite the fact that the EU arguably favors a multilateral approach to international relations, it is important to point out that multilateralism might not always be favorable to the EU. For instance, the formation of ad hoc bilateral or multilateral alliances — especially those excluding the EU — could potentially be damaging to Europe; a G-2 between China and America e.g. would slowly but inevitably make the US lean towards Asia, and render Europe increasingly irrelevant.

Moreover, even where the world is cooperative, it is only irregularly so, and in an unstructured manner at that. The recent years have certainly seen a booming of multilateral forums and organizations of all kind, creating a vast web of overlapping institutions sometimes reinforcing, sometimes contradicting each other, but most of the time serving the national interest of its members rather than the global interest. Richard Haass called this “messy multilateralism”[3]. Before him, Francis


Fukuyama had coined this “multi-multilateralism”[1]. Whatever the adjective, it indicates an instrumentalization of multilateralism for realpolitik purposes.

Condemning or trying to avoid such instrumentalization would be pointless. But established and emerging powers can still be convinced that finding new means for collaboration is in their own interest. The underlying assumption, acceptable by all parties, would be that a new world order needs new institutions, or at least reformed ones.

6. FROM CACOPHONY TO CONCERT

It is not too late to turn the global cacophony into a global Concert. But it is time to start working on the symphony. The G20 is precisely this kind of new institutions that have emerged from the crisis and could have a positive impact on the global order. To begin with, the G20 comprises all established and emerging powers (and even more) so in terms of representativeness it does better than the G8. This constitutes an important step for emerging powers in search of international recognition for their new — but contested — status. It also provides to emerging powers a feeling of commitment to the management of international affairs and makes them realize that growing power comes with growing responsibilities.

There is another important argument to be made in favor of the G20: by starting working together on a certain set of issues, and having some successes in the management of these issues, established and emerging powers will develop a mutual feeling of trust and confidence which will encourage them working on other issues, including the most sensitive ones. In this sense, the G20 could play a transitory role from the old to the new order.

The G20 is not unproblematic though. To begin with, greater representativeness does not equal global representativeness as most states are still excluded from this limited club. Greater representativeness is also no synonym with greater effectiveness — it could even be its antonym — although the G20 has shown some positive signs in its management of the crisis.

More importantly, the new G20 represents a significant threat to the EU preference for effective multilateralism. In other words, the EU desires more than a mere Concert: it desires a symphony orchestra in which everyone can play in harmony.

Indeed, if the empowerment of the G20 was a good option available to make sure emerging powers feel involved in the resolution of today’s global challenges, it can only be a transitory phase before a broader reform of the global multilateral architecture. If we want Russia, China, India or Brazil to abide by the rules of the WTO, the IMF or the UN, we have to strengthen (and eventually reshape) these institutions. Such strengthening of effective multilateralism can only be the result of a global bargain between established and emerging powers, in which the EU could develop a leading voice. Let the G20 become the path to a new global order, not its conclusion.